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LAW IN CIVIL SOCIETY, GOOD SOCIETY, AND THE
PRESCRIPTIVE STATE
AMITAI ETZIONI*
Two recent reports call attention to the fact that the American
society faces two "crises" rather than one. These studies are the
National Commission on Civic Renewal's A Nation of Spectators:
How Civic Disengagement Weakens America and What We Can Do
About It1 and the Council on Civil Society's A Call to Civil Society:
Why Democracy Needs Moral Truths.2 The first malaise results from
the deterioration of the civil society reflected in declines in voter
turnout, people interested in public affairs, and participation in
voluntary associations, among other developments. The second
results from the deterioration of society's moral foundation reflected
in and further fueled by a decline in focus on the family, high rates of
teen pregnancy and out of wedlock births, and a rise in the vile and
violent elements of the mass culture, among other developments.
To highlight that these reports go beyond the topics
encompassed in numerous previous examinations of the civil society,
A Nation of Spectators repeatedly refers to the "civic moral
conditions" of our country, and to the "moral and civil ills," to
indicate that much more than civility is at stake.3 The second report,
A Call to Civil Society (which in many ways parallels the
Communitarian platform),4 states from the outset that a "democracy
needs moral truths," and dedicates a good part of the discussion to
the symptoms of the "moral crisis" and what might be done to
* University Professor, George Washington University. I am indebted to Natalie Klein
for her research assistance and to Linda McClain and Rachel Mears for comments on a draft of
this article.
1. NATIONAL COMM'N ON CIVIC RENEWAL, A NATION OF SPECTATORS: How CIvIc
DISENGAGEMENT WEAKENS AMERICA AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (1998).
2. COUNCIL ON CIVIL Soc'Y, A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY: WHY DEMOCRACY NEEDS
MORAL TRUTHS (1998).
3. NATIONAL COMM'N ON CIVIC RENEWAL, supra note 1, at 5 (emphasis added).
4. See AM1TAI ETzIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND
THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA 251-67 (1993); Communitarian Network, The Responsive
Communitarian Platform: Rights and Responsibilities (visited Oct. 26, 1999) <http://www.gwu.
edu/-ccps/RCPlatform.html>.
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overcome it.5 "Moral truths" is a phrase that up to now has been
avoided by much of the literature on civil society for profound
reasons explored in this article.
I very much support the basic diagnosis and prognosis of these
two reports.6 To gain a fuller understanding of the two challenges-
the deterioration of civil society and of society's moral fiber- and the
ways they are to be faced, however, this article will argue that we
should treat them as distinct notions rather than try to pack both into
the notion of a civil society. This is suggested for both sociological
and intellectual reasons.
Sociologically speaking, the term civil society has a rather deep,
ensconced meaning in both academic and public discourse. It is
deeply associated with the Tocquevillean notion of a society whose
citizens' liberty is protected by a rich fabric of intermediary bodies
that stand between them and the state, and that themselves are
shored up by citizens able and inclined to participate in these
bodies-termed voluntary associations. The enemy of the civil
society, thus, is the overbearing state.
A typical definition of the civil society is "[tihat area of social life
that is neither familial and intimate on the one hand, nor state-
directed on the other. It includes voluntary organizations of various
kinds, ranging from private economic enterprises, to farmers granges,
to the Little Leagues. '7 Similarly, another source describes civil
society as "a particular form of society, appreciating social diversity
and able to limit the depredations of political power."8 A third source
defines civil society as follows:
The institutional core consists of the following combination of
political and socioeconomic arrangements: a government which is
limited and accountable and operates under the rule of law; a
market economy (implying a regime of private property); an array
of free, voluntary associations (political, economic, social and
cultural); and a sphere of free public debate.9
Yet another scholar states:
The values of civil society are those of political participation, state
5. COUNCIL ON CIVIL Soc'Y, supra note 2, at 3, 13.
6. I have written two books in support of the same basic thesis. See ETZIONI, supra note
4; AMITAI ETZIONI, THE NEW GOLDEN RULE: COMMUNITY AND MORALITY IN A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (1996).
7. BERNARD SUSSER, POLITICAL IDEOLOGY IN THE MODERN WORLD 277 (1995).
8. John A. Hall, In Search of Civil Society, in CIVIL SOCIETY: THEORY, HISTORY,
COMPARISON 1, 25 (John A. Hall ed., 1995).
9. Victor Perez-Diaz, The Possibility of Civil Society: Traditions, Character and
Challenges, in CIVIL SOCIETY: THEORY, HISTORY, COMPARISON, supra note 8, at 80,81.
[Vol. 75:355
LAW IN CIVIL SOCIETY
accountability, and publicity of politics .... The institutions of civil
society are associational and representative forums, a free press and
social associations. The inhabitant of this sphere is the rights
bearing and juridically-defined individual, i.e., the citizen. And the
protection of the members of civil society is encapsuled in the
vocabulary and the institution of rights.10
Literally hundreds of books and articles, if not thousands, use the
term in this way. While it is true that one can find rather different
definitions, especially in the original use of the term," there seems to
me little doubt that currently the term is strongly established and
hence resists being subsumed into other meanings, such as arguing
that a civil society entails equal command of economic and social
assets by citizens (equality), accepts the feminist orientation,12 or is
moral. This takes nothing away from the power of the moral renewal
argument other than its need for, as the two reports strongly imply, an
added and distinct concept from that of the civil society. I shall refer
to this as the "good society."' 3
Intellectual analysis points in the same direction. It is the thesis
of this article that the crisis of the good society, "the revivification of
civil society" (to use Jean Elshtain's fine term),'14 and the role of law
within it are all conceptually significantly different from, although not
necessarily incompatible with, the same factors in the civil society.
After a brief discussion of the basic terms, I delineate the
difference in the following realms: basic philosophical anchoring; the
basic role of law; differences between citizenship and membership;
the kinds of virtues upheld by the good society and civil society; the
societies' rather divergent views of voluntary associations; the
societies' distinct relations to achieved versus ascribed status; and the
societies' perspectives on individual rights and social responsibilities.
One reason to speak about the civil society even when dealing
with issues of the good society (especially the moral crisis and how it
might be overcome) is that the second concept is much more
10. NEERA CHANDHOKE, STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY: EXPLORATIONS IN POLITICAL
THEORY 9 (1995).
11. For older derivations of the phrase, see DOMINIQUE COLAS, CIVIL SOCIETY AND
FANATICISM: CONJOINED HISTORIES xv, 9, 24-25, 33 (Amy Jacobs trans., 1997); DENNIS H.
WRONG, THE PROBLEM OF ORDER 87-88 (1994).
12. See Linda C. McClain & James E. Fleming, Some Questions for Civil Society-
Revivalists, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 301, 327-35 (2000); Susan H. Williams, A Feminist
Reassessment of Civil Society, 72 IND. L.J. 417, 425 (1997).
13. Cf. ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., THE GOOD SOCIETY (1992).
14. JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL 16 (1995).
20001
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
contested.' 5  People from a very wide ideological and political
spectrum favor a civil society. A call supporting the renewal of a
good society per se (without civil society overtones) is likely to garner
much less support among liberals; they fear that what is entailed in
social definitions of the good would turn society into an intolerant
state, which would impose that which society considers virtuous. I
hence must introduce a third concept, that of the prescriptive state, to
show that a good society can be intellectually distinct and
sociologically viable without becoming an intolerant state.
THREE IDEAL TYPES
To reiterate, following a very long tradition, which has generated
thousands of books and articles, the term "civil society" is best used
to refer to societies that have a rich fabric of voluntary associations
and other intermediary bodies that stand between the individual and
the state, and whose citizens have the wherewithal required to sustain
such a society (e.g., are able to think critically). In a book often cited
in this context, Peter Berger and Richard Neuhaus define the civil
society as "those institutions that stand between the private world of
individuals and the large, impersonal structures of modern society.
They 'mediated' by constituting a vehicle by which personal beliefs
and values could be transmitted into the mega-institutions. They
were thus 'Janus-faced' institutions, facing both 'upward' and
'downward.'"16
Among the many others who define or treat the civil society in
the same manner are Robert Fine and Shirin Rai,' 7 Benjamin
Barber,' 8 E.J. Dionne,' 9 and Robert Putnam.2° Putnam in particular
relies on a Tocquevillean perspective:
When Alexis de Tocqueville visited the United States in the 1830s,
it was the Americans' propensity for civic association that most
impressed him as the key to their unprecedented ability to make
15. See, e.g., ANDREW BARD SCHMOOKLER, DEBATING THE GOOD SOCIETY: A QUEST
TO BRIDGE AMERICA'S MORAL DIVIDE (1999).
16. Peter L. Berger & Richard John Neuhaus, Peter L. Berger and Richard John Neuhaus
Respond, in TO EMPOWER PEOPLE: FROM STATE TO CIVIL SOCIETY 145, 148 (Michael Novak
ed., 1996).
17. Robert Fine & Shirin Rai, Understanding Civil Society, in CIVIL SOCIETY:
DEMOCRATIC PERSPECTIVES 1 (Robert Fine & Shirin Rai eds., 1997).
18. BENJAMIN R. BARBER, A PLACE FOR Us: HOW TO MAKE SOCIETY CIVIL AND
DEMOCRACY STRONG (1998).
19. E.J. Dionne, Jr., Why Civil Society? Why Now?, BROOKINGS REV., Fall 1997, at 4.
20. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN
ITALY (1993).
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democracy work. Recently, social scientists of a neo-Tocquevillean
bent have unearthed a wide range of empirical evidence that the
theoretical premise of his argument is no less accurate today-that
the quality of public life and the performance of social institutions
(not only in the United States) are powerfully influenced by norms
and networks of civic engagement.21
The term "good society" might be used to refer to societies that
rely mainly on their moral infrastructure (e.g., families, schools,
communities) and informal social controls to foster a core of
substantive (as distinct from merely procedural) moral values.22 The
term "prescriptive state" might be used to refer to states that to a
considerable extent rely on means of coercion to enforce such moral
values, and that have an extensive list of values they seek to impose
rather than a limited core.
I cannot stress enough that these are three abstractions or ideal
types. Actual societies mix various elements of these categories,
although some are much more of one kind than the others. I return
to the question of combinations after the ideal types are further
discussed. This is a particularly important issue given that there are
those who argue that ultimately a civil society rests on the moral
foundations provided by the good society, a position explicitly
embraced by A Call to Civil Society.23
The following illustrates the differences among the three basic
concepts. No society has ever truly approximated the civil society,
but Britain and the United States are often said to have approximated
such a social order. A relatively pure case of a good society in the
terms defined here was found in the early kibbutzim because these
communities have strong shared definitions of the good but foster it
with next to no reliance on coercion. Examples of strongly
prescriptive states can be seen in theocracies such as contemporary
Iran, Taliban, Afghanistan, and nationalistic or socialist tyrannies
such as the Nazi regime, the USSR, and North Korea. Comparatively
very mild and moderate versions of the prescriptive state are
advanced by American social conservatives who wish to outlaw
abortion, ban divorce, require prayer in public schools, ban
homosexual activities, and vastly increase the kind of actions for
21. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone, Revisited, RESPONSIVE COMMuNTrY, Spring 1995,
at 18, 18.
22. For an outstanding recent treatment of these in the discussion of "everyday
democracy," see NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS: THE PERSONAL USES
OF PLURALISM IN AMERICA (1998).
23. COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOC'Y, supra note 2, at 6.
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which criminal punishment is metered out (as well as sharply increase
the severity of these punishments). These are measures that seek to
control behavior through the force of the state.24
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
The three concepts are anchored in three social philosophies.
The civil society rests on classical liberalism and its contemporary
offshoots. Given that this philosophy seeks to rely on each person to
define the good rather than the society, liberalism seeks to leave
value decisions as much as possible in the private realm, keeping the
public realm thin and procedural and hence of very limited
substantive, normative moral content.25
John Rawls seems26 to go a step further by not only implying that
the various mediating institutions are morally equivalent, but also
suggesting that the entirety of civil society-not merely the liberal
state! -is little more than a neutral zone in which various virtues
compete and in which none is prescribed or even preferred as a
matter of societal policy. The following quote appears to me to speak
quite directly to the issue at hand, and it is this Rawls I address here:
[AIll discussions are from the point of view of citizens in the culture
of civil society, which Habermas calls the public sphere. There, we
as citizens discuss how justice as fairness is to be formulated, and
whether this or that aspect of it seems acceptable .... In the same
way, the claims of the ideal of discourse and of its procedural
conception of democratic institutions are considered. Keep in mind
that this background culture contains comprehensive doctrines of
all kinds that are taught, explained, debated one against another,
and argued about -indefinitely without end as long as society has
vitality and spirit.... It is the culture of daily life with its many
associations: its universities and churches, learned and scientific
societies; endless political discussions of ideas and doctrines are
commonplace everywhere. 27
This text is compatible with the notion that a civil society is not a
good society because it does not promote one "comprehensive
doctrine," but rather simply provides the forum in which a plurality of
24. See Amitai Etzioni & Robert P. George, Virtue and the State: A Dialogue Between a
Communitarian and a Social Conservative, RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Spring 1999, at 54, 54-66.
25. For more discussion, see CLASSICAL LIBERALISM AND CIVIL SOCIETY (Charles K.
Rowley ed., 1997).
26. I write "seems" to indicate that I do not join here the very elaborate debate concerning
what Rawls says, really meant to say, and how he changed his mind from one volume to the
next. See, e.g., EQUALITY AND LIBERTY: ANALYZING RAWLS AND NOZICK (J. Angelo Corlett
ed., 1991).
27. JOHN RAwLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 382-83 (1996).
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such doctrines can be debated "indefinitely without end" within the
numerous voluntary associations. Civil society is thus desirable
because it affords and sustains endless debate, thereby precluding
shared understanding of the good to which society at large can
subscribe and attempt to foster in its members. In that sense, the
"endless" element is not merely dismissive but actually essential.
Michael Walzer, often considered a communitarian,28 espouses
the same liberal viewpoint very clearly:
I would rather say that the civil society argument is a corrective to
the four ideological accounts of the good life.., rather than a fifth
to stand alongside them. It challenges their singularity but it has no
singularity of its own. The phrase "social being" describes men and
women who are citizens, producers, consumers, members of the
nation, and much else besides-and none of these by nature or
because it is the best thing to be. The associational life of civil
society is the actual ground where all versions of the good are
worked out and tested.., and proved to be partial, incomplete,
ultimately unsatisfying ....
Ideally, civil society is a setting of settings: all are included,
none is preferred. 29
The good society builds on communitarian philosophy. It
assumes social definitions of the good and that a well-functioning
society, let alone a good one, requires a core of substantive (rather
than merely procedural) shared values, which in part define not only
public but also private proper behavior. These values are transmitted
from generation to generation by the family, schools, and the
community (including its places of worship and civic associations).
Moral dialogues3 then recast values bequeathed by earlier
generations. And a good society relies first and largely on informal
social controls (or the moral voice)31 rather than on coercion to
undergird shared values.
The prescriptive state relies on socially conservative conceptions.
Of these, the most commonly observed are religious, in those
instances where religious groups sanction the use of the state to
enforce their very extensive (as distinct from "core") list of values.
These values are reflected in the dictates, duties, and obligations
2& See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983); Michael Walzer,
Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, 18 POL. THEORY 6, 6-23 (1990).
29. Michael Walzer, The Concept of Civil Society, in TOWARD A GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY
7, 16 (Michael Walzer ed., 1995).
30. For discussion of these as compared to reasoned deliberations, see ETZIONI, supra note
6, at 102-10.
31. For discussion of the moral voice, see id. at 119-59.
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imposed by the state. Secular tyrannies have a similar pattern,
although the values they promote are often national, social, or both,
rather than religious. Prescriptive states of both kinds often seek to
control most of what a person does, consumes, reads, hears, and even
thinks.
THE BASIC ROLE OF THE LAW
The three approaches define the basic role of law in society
rather differently. More will be said about this subject, but as a
preliminary observation the civil society seeks to minimize reliance
on the law because it sees the law as a tool of the state, which it seeks
to countervail. In addition, the civil society views the law as largely
instrumental, facilitating voluntary arrangements among parties,
especially contracts.
Most important, in civil society, law is designed to be
evenhanded, fair, and largely procedural. The law is "blind"; all
citizens are to be treated equally. Indeed, one of the main objections
liberal advocates of the civil society raise to conceptions of the good
society is that the good society is discriminatory: some people are
viewed as more moral than others.32 This possibility disappears when
the society per se has no shared definition of the good and this matter
is left to each individual. As Will Kymlicka states:
Some communitarians argue that the liberal preference for the
cultural marketplace over the state as the appropriate arena for
evaluating different ways of life stems from an atomistic belief thatjudgements about the good are only autonomous when they are
made by isolated individuals who are protected from social
pressure. 33
The good society seeks to minimize reliance on the law not
because the law often preempts private decisions but because it often
undermines (although it does sometimes serve to reinforce) informal
social controls by replacing them. Also, while the good society
recognizes the instrumental role of the law, it also draws on its
expressive role to state and underscore the values the society
cherishes. Thus, when the law in such a society enforces parents'
duties to their children, its primary purpose is not to facilitate familial
arrangements but to communicate the high value this kind of society
places on parenting. Further, laws that "require" people to be good
32. See SCHMOOKLER, supra note 15.
33. WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 219-20 (1990).
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Samaritans serve more to define such a moral expectation than to
make people good Samaritans by the small fines imposed if and when
a person is charged and convicted of not being a good Samaritan.
Most important, the good society is willing to rely on the law to
promote a limited but important list of substantive social values, even
if this means treating citizens unequally.34 Such measures include
environmental protection, reverse discrimination, and limited
reallocation of wealth. 5
While prescriptive states too might prefer not to resort to the
law, given the strong and wide disaffection of their members and the
extensive and comprehensive list of values to which they demand
compliance, these states end up making law and law enforcement the
mainstay of their regimes.
CITIZENS THIN AND THICK VERSUS MEMBERS
The three approaches differ fundamentally in their view of the
place of the person within the social order, which is highlighted in
their legal treatment of citizenship. The civil society draws a sharp
line between the citizen and the person. The citizen is the role the
person has in the public realm (e.g., paying taxes, voting, serving in
the military and on juries, obeying the law), while most of life takes
place (or ought to take place) in the separate private realm of the
individual. While the thin realm of citizenship is governed by various
laws, the thick private realm is subject to individual choices. And
while there is some role for laws in the private realm, for instance,
those concerning private property, basically the civil society is not
merely compatible with a thin layer of laws in the private realm, but
also with a thin public realm, and hence with relatively few laws
governing public roles. 6 (Feminist and communitarian criticism of
this sharp distinction between the public and private realm seems to
me well taken.) 37
34. See William R. Lund, Taking Autonomy Seriously, RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, winter
1998-1999, at 10, 20.
35. An argument can be made that all such laws are meant to ensure that all citizens will
become equal, but one can show quite readily that actually these laws reflect substantive
concepts of what is considered good by the societies that enacted these laws.
36. See David Boaz, Enemies of Civil Society, CATO POL'Y REP., July-Aug. 1999, at 2, 2,
for a critique of this view.
37. For a feminist critique of the distinction between the public and private realm, see
ELIZABETH FRAZER & NICOLA LACEY, THE POLITICS OF COMMUNITY: A FEMINIST
CRITIQUE OF THE LIBERAL-COMMUNTrARIAN DEBATE 72-76 (1993); SUSAN MOLLER OKIN,
JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 110-33 (1989). For a communitarian critique of the
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While the ideal citizen's role in the civil society is limited, proper
citizens of the civil society are expected to be active, follow public
affairs, participate in local decision making, and so on, rather than act
like passive consumers-a point often stressed by Benjamin Barber 38
as well as Harry Boyte and Nancy Kari.39
The good society's main concern is with membership, not
citizenship, that is, with the roles a person plays in various social
bodies, which are largely governed by mores rather than by laws,
although obviously laws have a role. Most of the responsibilities of
the good person are neither political nor personal, but social-to
one's children, parents, spouse, friends, neighbors, or other members
of his or her immediate community and more encompassing social
entities. While in actual societies various laws help to define some of
these membership roles (e.g., child support), in the ideal good society
people fulfill their social roles most often because they believe that
this is the right thing to do rather than because they fear the law. To
repeat, the early kibbutzim approximated this ideal type.4°
A core concept of the prescriptive state is thick citizenship and
thin membership, as the prescriptive state in principle recognizes little
of the personal sphere. Citizenship is typically involuntary (as
highlighted by sealed borders). Citizens' duties are very numerous,
reflecting a vast list of values which are ensconced in numerous laws
and adherence to which is enforced by law. These concern practically
every aspect of personal life, including what people must wear (e.g.,
veils), cannot eat (pork), cannot drink (Coca-Cola), cannot listen to
(jazz or BBC), and so on. Moderate versions of such states were
found in authoritarian communities in the United States in the 1950s,
for instance, those in which hanging a United Nations flag,
frequenting a gay bar, or admitting a black person into a
predominantly white public school led to violence supported by the
state .41
A closely related and very telling difference among the three
types of societies concerns their view of human nature. As I have
distinction between the public and private realm, see AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF
PRIVACY 183-216 (1999).
38. BARBER, supra note 18.
39. HARRY C. BOYTE & NANCY N. KAR, BUILDING AMERICA: THE DEMOCRATIC
PROMISE OF PUBLIC WORK (1996).
40. See infra p. 359.
41. See, e.g., A QUEER WORLD: THE CENTER FOR LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES READER
(Martin Doberman ed., 1997); MAJOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN HISTORY SINCE 1945 (Robert
Griffith ed., 1992).
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spelled out this point elsewhere, 42 I note here merely that the civil
society views people as essentially good in nature, but corruptible by
the state. The prescriptive state views people as highly impulsive,
rather irrational, and in need of restraint by the state. The good
society views people as initially, in childhood, impulsive and
irrational, but open to socialization capable of developing them into
good persons, allowing for an intact moral infrastructure. Unlike the
civil society, this concept does not view people as good by nature.
Instead, it recognizes that, even if socialization is highly successful,
people will be considerably tempted by the lower angels of their
nature. This will require a continual exercise of informal social
controls if people are to be as good as they can be. Accordingly,
while both the state and society can corrupt people, the society is
often a major source of introducing and sustaining people's virtues.
WHICH VIRTUES?
While analysts of all three kinds of societies may refer to virtues,
the list of virtues each extols, which is needed to sustain the particular
kind of society, is far from identical, a point all too often disregarded.
The typical virtue list of the civil society consists of moderation,
tolerance, self-control, and critical thinking as well as following news
about public affairs, participating in public affairs (democratic
process), and volunteering.4 3 Others claim that "[b]eing honest, kind,
helpful, dependable, fair, and respecting others' rights are some of the
character traits most highly valued in our society. Initiative,
organization, decision skills, and readiness to apply all the above
traits to betterment of the community (citizenship), are also highly
regarded.. .."44
These civil virtues have two important attributes: (1) they
concern individuals (unlike the virtues incorporated into public
policies and laws-for example, those mandating national service in
Germany) and (2) they are by and large procedural rather than
substantive.
Take, for instance, staying informed about public affairs (rather
than merely sports and consumer goods) as an attribute of individual
citizens. It is basically content free: there is no particular kind of the
42 See ETZIONI, supra note 6, at 160-88.
43. See COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOC'Y, supra note 2, at 7-13.
44. Vincent N. Campbell & Richard A. Bond, Evaluation of a Character Education
Curriculum, in EDUCATION FOR VALUES, 134,134 (David C. McClelland ed., 1982).
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very large world of public affairs of which staying informed is
considered, in principle, as more virtuous than any others. Tolerance
is another personal attribute, closely related to self-control. Both of
these are content free: the virtuous citizen of the civil society is not
more tolerant of, say, Jews than blacks and blacks than homosexuals.
The same of course holds for religious tolerance that encompasses all
religions as well as atheism.
The essential virtues the civil society requires are personal rather
than social ones (those which the society considers good). This point
is illustrated by laws concerning marriage. Advocates of the civil
society have difficulty explaining why they refuse (when they do
refuse) to recognize gay marriages, polygamy, and many other
"alternative lifestyle" arrangements as equally legal as traditional
marriages as long as these arrangements are between (or among)
consenting adults who wish to encode their relationship in a legal
form.4
5
In the same vein, public education, an essential feature of the
civil society, is focused on building up personal virtues and
capabilities. For instance, the civil society focuses on critical thinking
rather than social virtues such as dedication to preserve the
environment for future generations 6 During a panel discussion on
the subject at the 1999 meeting of the American Political Science
Association, a line repeated was that civic education should entail
"transmission of knowledge and skills but be character neutral. '47
When one of the participants suggested that children should be taught
reverence for the Constitution, Amy Gutmann argued that there was
no reason to exempt the Constitution from critical examination. The
well-known debate on whether Amish children should be exempted
from attending required secondary education concerns the question
of whether they can be citizens of a civil society without learning to
think critically.4
In contrast, members of the good society are expected to have
not only personal, but also relational and social virtues. In addition to
being reliable citizens, they are also supposed to be good parents,
45. See, e.g., Berger & Neuhaus, supra note 16.
46. Compare AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (1987), with WILLIAM A.
GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE
(1991).
47. I was present at this event.
48. For additional discussion of this subject, see EAMONN CALLAN, CREATING CITIZENS:
POLITICAL EDUCATION AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 44-47 (1997).
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friends, neighbors, and community members. That is, particularistic
loyalties (rather than merely reciprocity) are an earmark of members
of the good society.
Above all, members of the good society are expected to
contribute to select causes that the good society seeks to foster, rather
than merely to choose their own causes. The good society, for
instance, holds in higher regard working in soup kitchens and clinics
for the poor, volunteering to serve in the Peace Corps or
AmeriCorps, and helping AIDS victims more than donating to the
opera or serving on the board of a country club. Many continental
societies value the welfare state, lower inequality, and social
amenities even if these social virtues entail sacrificing some measure
of economic growth. (They advance these social virtues as good in
their own right rather than as instrumental values that help people
become equal and effective members of the civil society.)
Education for membership in the good society includes
developing commitments to substantive values and a shared
definition of the good. Commitments to the protection of the
environment are a case in point as are various notions about the
virtue of diversity and social justice.
The prescriptive state's list of virtues is still different. The good
citizen is one who first of all complies with the law and discharges
diligently and in good faith the numerous state. defined duties. Better
yet, the virtuous citizen voluntarily contributes to the state above and
beyond what the state demands, for instance, by donating time or
resources to causes that the state specifies. And, the good citizen
helps law enforcement by checking on neighbors, friends, and kin to
ensure that they also conduct themselves as virtuous citizens.
The differences among the three kinds of societies are
highlighted by their tax laws. The civil society seeks tax neutrality; it
prefers to avoid favoring one behavior over another. Proportional
taxes are compatible with the civil society; progressive taxes are
compatible only to the extent that they can be shown as promoting
the ability of citizens to partake in the civil society.
In contrast, a good society might well provide special tax
privileges to behavior it considers socially virtuous, for instance, being
married or having children. (Many societies provide subsidies to
those who have children.)49
49. See CHILD CARE, PARENTAL LEAVE, AND THE UNDER 3s: POLICY INNOVATION IN
EUROPE (Sheila B. Kamerman & Alfred J. Kahn eds., 1991).
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The same issue arises with regard to public support of the arts
and other cultural projects. Champions of the civil society
strenuously objected when federal agencies such as the National
Endowment for the Arts and the National Endowment for the
Humanities sought not to fund projects that offended some core
social values, such as photos that showed Christ on a cross dipped in
urine.50 A good society would take it for granted that it will provide
public funds only to projects that enhance, or at least do not
undermine, that which it considers virtuous.
The prescriptive state tends to require people to follow its
various dictates and punishes them when they do not, rather than
rewarding them when they do. For instance: divorce is banned rather
than marriage rewarded; abortions are banned rather than adoptions
provided for children not wanted by their parents; community service
is required rather than extolled when people volunteer; the armed
forces rely on the draft rather than on pay and patriotic persuasion.
COMBINED TYPES
So far I have focused on ideal types, which themselves are not
pure. For instance, a civil society may have some limited elements of
a prescriptive state, and vice versa.51 More importantly, to further
develop this line of argumentation, other combinations must be
considered, which I cannot do within the confines of this article.
However, some preliminary observations might serve to point the
direction of such an extension.
Theoretically, liberals could amend their opposition to a shared
definition of the good by arguing that they refer only to such
definitions imposed by the state, but not to those fostered by informal
social processes. Such a specification of their position would greatly
reduce the difference between the civil and good society. (Indeed
Philip Selznick argues for communitarian liberalism somewhat along
these lines.)52 However, it is not accidental that as a rule liberals do
not make this move.53 One reason seems that they fear that once
50. For debate, see Robert Brustein, The First Amendment and the NEA, NEW REPUBLIC,
Sept. 11, 1989, at 27, 27-29.
51. Singapore, for instance, allows its citizens a considerable measure of religious choice.
See Inoue Tatsuo, Liberal Democracy and Asian Orientalism, in THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 43 (Joanne Bauer & Daniel A. Bell eds., 1999).
52. Philip Selznick, Foundations of Communitarian Liberalism, RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY,
Fall 1994, at 16, 16-28.
53. See Jonathan Rauch, Conventional Wisdom, REASON, Feb. 2000, at 37, 37-41.
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there is a strong social consensus it might be sanctioned by state
action. Another reason seems that they are so keen to protect
individual choices that they seek for individuals to be free from
informal social controls and not merely the state.54
Most surprisingly, liberals found a way to endorse those
substantive values they favor-without seeming to yield ground.
When I asked a liberal colleague whether liberals would favor a
progressive income tax, affirmative action, and environmental
protection, she responded in the affirmative. When queried on what
grounds, she argued that all these policies enhance the ability of
individuals to be citizens. But these arguments are highly tortured.
Progressive income tax does preciously little to make people better
citizens, and the same holds for spotted owls and snail darters. They
do reflect certain values of what we hold to be a good society. The
liberal appeal to these values indicates their yearning to move in the
direction of a communitarian, good society.5
THREE VIEWS OF VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS
From the viewpoint of the discussion at hand, the most important
characteristic of civil society is that it draws no difference among
voluntary associations with regard to the substantive values that are
fostered by these associations. I am not suggesting that these
associations are without specific normative dispositions. For instance:
little leagues may cherish a healthy body and sporting behavior (or
winning at all costs); book clubs foster respect for learning and
culture; and so on. But from the viewpoint of their contribution to
civil society, they all are treated by champions of civil society as
basically equivalent; none is, normatively speaking, inherently
morally superior to the other.56
Certainly champions of civil society do recognize some
differences among voluntary associations, but these are limited to
their functions as elements of the civil society rather than to their
normative content.5 7 For instance, voluntary associations that are
54. While Mill's statement is open to different interpretations, if one reads the text as
written, he makes this point: "But neither one person, nor any number of persons, is warranted
in saying to another human creature.., that he shall not do with his life for his benefit what he
chooses to do with it." JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 71 (David Spitz ed., 1975).
55. See STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSHTY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC EDUCATION IN A
MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY (2000).
56. See KYMLICKA, supra note 33, at 219.
57. For a typical normatively neutral definition of civil society, see SUSSER, supra note 7, at
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more effective in developing citizenship skills are preferred over
those that are less so. But the actual values to which people involved
in these groups apply their skills are not under review, nor are other
substantive values that such associations embody.
For the civil society, an association that facilitates playing bridge
has the same basic standing as the Red Cross; members of the Elks
command the same status as those of the Promise Keepers; bowling
leagues are indistinguishable from the North American Man/Boy
Love Association, which advocates removing the age of consent for
sex and whose members meet to exchange tips on how to seduce boys
younger than eight.5 8 Beyond league bowling and bridge playing,
other mainstays of "social capital" that Robert Putnam found in his
studies of civic society in Italy as more soundly civil and democratic
than others were bird-watching groups and choral societies.5 9 Bird-
watching groups may enhance respect for nature and choirs may
cherish culture (or certain kinds of culture over others), but this is not
the reason Putnam praises them. As Putnam puts it, he extols them
because "[t]aking part in a choral society or a bird-watching club can
teach self-discipline and an appreciation for the joys of successful
collaboration." 60 So could most, if not all, other types of voluntary
associations.
While one voluntary association is basically as good as any other
from the basic standpoint of the civil society,61 they differ greatly from
the perspective of the good society precisely because they embody
different values. Thus, to the extent that American society cherishes
the notion of interracial integration, it views the Urban League and
NAACP as much more in line with its values than the Nation of
Islam, and the Ripon Society more so than the Aryan groups-all
voluntary associations.62 Berger and Neuhaus concede this point in a
277.
58. See North Am. ManlBoy Love Ass'n, Positive and Beneficial Experiences (visited Nov.
29, 1999) <http://www.nambla.orgfbenefit.htnil>.
59. PUTNAM, supra note 20, at 90.
60. Id. at 90.
61. The relevant differences are instrumental rather than principled or normative (for
example, the relative size, the level of public education, etc.).
62. See Suzanna Sherry, "Without Virtue There Can Be No Liberty," 78 MINN. L. REv. 61
(1993). A somewhat similar point is made by the noted civil theorist Benjamin Barber. While
Barber is a fan of voluntary associations generally, he warns against those that are so
"privatistic, or parochial, or particularistic" that they undermine democracy. BENJAMIN R.
BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLMCS FOR A NEW AGE 235 (1984). He
writes: "Parochialism enhances the immediate tie between neighbors by separating them from
alien 'others,' but it thereby subverts the wider ties required by democracy-ties that can be
nurtured only by an expanding imagination bound to no particular sect or fraternity." Id.
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revised edition of their book:
Possibly, though, we were a bit carried away in our enthusiasm for
these institutions, overlooking the fact that some of them definitely
play nefarious roles in society. Thus, strictly speaking in terms of
our definition, the Mafia, the Ku Klux Klan, and the local branch of
an organization seeking to get the government to negotiate with
visiting aliens in UFOs could also be described as mediating
structures. They do, indeed, mediate between individuals and the
larger society. It just happens that the beliefs and values thus
mediated are criminal, immoral, or plain crazy. We would suggest
now that there are (to put it plainly) both good and bad mediating
structures and that social policy will have to make this
differentiation in terms of the values being mediated.63
Walzer clearly distinguishes the civil society from the good
society.64 Indeed, at one point he makes mocking reference to a
potential slogan for civil society: "Join the associations of your
choice." 65 He argues that it entails a less than morally-compelling and
mobilizing vision.66 Walzer regrets that the anti-ideological nature of
the civil society makes it unable to inspire citizens, but implies that
this feature is necessary to prevent the idealization of the state.67 I
will return to the importance of this point, which reflects a fear
implicit in Walzer's remarks, that the social formation of the good will
lead to authoritarianism, if not totalitarianism.6
I digress to note that no society is "good" in some ultimate sense;
they are societies that aspire to promote specific substantive social
virtues, and in this sense aspire to be good societies. The extent to
which they are successful and the normative evaluation of the specific
virtues one society promotes as compared to others are subjects not
studied here because this would require an extensive treatment that I
have provided elsewhere.69 All that I argue here is that good societies
promote particularistic, substantive formations of the good; these are
limited sets of core values that are promoted largely by the moral
voice and not by state coercion. The conditions under which the
particular values fostered earn our acclaim are not studied here.70
63. Berger & Neuhaus, supra note 16, at 149-50.
64. Walzer, supra note 29.
65. Id. at 25.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 23-25.
68. For further discussion and criticism of this conception of civil society, see Jean Cohen,
Interpreting the Notion of Civil Society, in TOWARD A GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 29,
at 35, 35.




The difference between the two ways of treating voluntary
associations is reflected in tax and other laws. A civil society grants
all voluntary associations tax-exempt status whatever the social
virtues the association promotes or undermines. A good society
would deny such exceptions to all associations that offend any of its
core values, for instance, associations advocating discrimination
against minorities and women.
While both the civil society and good society draw on voluntary
associations, these play rather different roles within the two systems.
In the civil society, voluntary associations serve as mediating
institutions between the citizen and the state, and help cultivate
citizenship skills (e.g., ways to gain knowledge about public affairs,
form associations, gain a political voice, and so on); they develop and
exercise the democratic muscle, so to speak. In the good society,
select voluntary associations also serve to introduce members to
particularistic values as well as to reinforce an individual's normative
commitments. Thus, attending and actively participating in a meeting
of the Moral Majority, the National Rifle Association, the AFL-CIO,
and Mothers Against Drunk Driving serves not merely to develop
civic skills but also to enforce a whole slew of substantive values,
although of course rather different ones.
The prescriptive state's view on voluntary associations is well-
known and hence requires no discussion. It tends to consider such
associations as a threat to its general regime and to specific laws.
Prescriptive states tend either to enact laws banning voluntary
associations or to ensure that the laws serve the state by maintaining a
voluntary appearance while actually serving as arms of the
government.
ACHIEVED VERSUS ASCRIBED RELATIONS
It is far from accidental that, while hardcore advocates of the
civil society invariably view voluntary associations as the pillars of the
civil society,7 while families and communities are often not cited to at
all, or added as an afterthought. For instance, David Boaz writes that
"[c]ivil society is all the rage these days. The term refers to the
complex network of voluntary organizations in society-churches,
schools, clubs, associations, businesses, labor unions, and so on. 72 In
71. See, e.g., CIVIL SOCIETY: DEMOCRATIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 17.
72. Boaz, supra note 36, at 2.
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a special issue of the Brookings Review dedicated to the civil society,
editor E. J. Dionne, Jr., characterizes the civil society as (a) "a society
where people treat each other with kindness and respect, avoiding the
nastiness we have come to associate with 30-second political ads and a
certain kind of televised brawl"; and (b) a collection of voluntary
associations that includes Boy and Girl Scouts, little leagues, veterans
groups, book clubs, Lions and Elks Associations, churches, and
neighborhood crime watch groups.73 Most discussions stress the
second feature. "Bowling alone" has become somewhat of a symbol
for this line of thinking. Robert Putnam, however, argues that
bowling with one's friends (which he terms alone) is less sustaining
for civil society than bowling as members of a bowling league because
such leagues are part and parcel of the voluntary associations that
civil society requires. 74
In effect, one of the best indicators of the underlying position of
various advocates is to note the place of families and communities in
their analysis. While civil society purists do not list them at all, those
who combine the advocacy of a civil and good society list both
voluntary associations and families and communities as
"intermediary" bodies. For instance, Jean Bethke Elshtain describes
the civil society as such: "By civil society, I mean the many forms of
community and association that dot the landscape of a democratic
culture, from families to churches to neighborhood groups to trade
unions to self-help movements to volunteer assistance to the needy. '75
And those who are strong advocates of the good society but
prefer the language of the civil society for various reasons list families
and communities first and all other bodies as secondary.76
The underlying reason for this position is that families and
communities are often much less voluntary and provide much fewer
opportunities for civil education and practice than voluntary
associations. This is especially true of ascribed membership, the kind
one acquires by birth rather than fashions, i.e., the kind of
membership one has in one's family, one's initial membership in an
ethnic or racial group, and "birth" residential and other communities
(e.g., religious). Even those families and communities that one joins
cannot be as readily changed as membership, say, in the Elks or a
73. Dionne, supra note 19, at 5.
74. Putnam, supra note 21, at 18-33.
75. ELSHTAIN, supra note 14, at 5.




While some have claimed that being a member of an ascribed
group can also serve to build up one's public skills,77 which are
essential for the civil society, this is often not the case. I fully agree
with McClain and Fleming when they wonder about David
Blankenhorn's claim that families are the primary place to prepare
good citizens, for instance, during dinner table talks. 78 Families, when
they work well, lay the groundwork for good people, forming their
character, not their political skills. Families are neither role models
of democracy nor a place to acquire the skills of participation in a
voluntary association.
All this is not to suggest that these ascribed or semi-voluntary
groups are incompatible with the civil society-far from it. Indeed,
they often serve as a very effective bulwark against the state. But
they are not as attractive to civil society theory and practice as full-
fledged voluntary associations.
The opposite is true for the good society. Families and
communities of all kinds are mainstays of the moral infrastructure
and informal social controls. The strong affective bonding these
social units entail ensures their effectiveness as socialization units and
mechanisms of social enforcement. They have a relatively strong
hold on their members. In contrast, voluntary associations' hold on
their members, on average, is much lighter and often has limited or
no moral content. Bowling leagues or informal groups may foster
some mores of their own (concerning fair play, punctuality, and such),
but as a rule have very little impact as far as the main moral
foundations of society are concerned. The same holds for chess clubs
and, albeit somewhat less so, for choirs. (These are, of course, the
examples given by Putnam of the mainstays of democracy and the
civic society.) 79
The prescriptive state is wary of both voluntary associations and
ascribed social units. It uses its powers to abolish or co-opt ascribed
groups as well as voluntary associations. Thus, both the Nazis and the
USSR tried to suppress the family or use it for their own purposes.
The same can be true of ethnic and religious communities.
The relationship of these distinctions to the law is as follows: the
77. See David Blankenhorn, Conclusion: The Possibility of Civil Society, in SEEDBEDS OF
VIRTUE: SOURCES OF COMPETENCE, CHARACTER, AND CITIZENSHIP IN AMERICAN SOCIETY
271 (Mary Ann Glendon & David Blankenhorn eds., 1995).
78. McClain & Fleming, supra note 12, at 331-36.
79. See PUTNAM, supra note 20, at 90.
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civil society prefers contracts over familial and other ascribed
obligations because contracts are voluntary while ascribed obligations
are given. (This point was made as early as 1861 by Sir Henry
Sumner Maine.)8° The good society combines respect for ascribed
relations (especially those of the family and community one is born
into as distinct from the relations one joins by marriage or mobility)
with achieved ones. The prescriptive state seeks to reach directly to
individuals and is hostile to both ascribed and achieved relationships
that are not state driven, derived, or controlled. Both the Nazis and
the Communists (especially in the earlier era of the USSR) were
rather hostile to the family and demanded that members put loyalty
to the state and its laws above those of the ascribed relationship.
However, these states had no more respect for achieved relations, like
joining a labor union.
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
There is a strong affinity between the civil society and the
championing of individual rights. The main reason is that individual
rights are first and foremost claims against the government, meant
explicitly to hold it at bay and to secure the private realm. The fact
that individual rights are considered universal and not particularistic,
not bound to one group or community, further enhances the
compatibility. Last but not least, such rights entail no social
definition of the good other than their own goodness. Hence,
practically all the numerous laws nourished by the Bill of Rights are
standard fare of the civil society.
The key concept of the good society is often said to be
responsibility, the sense that one is morally committed to attend to
certain tasks such as taking care of one's children, helping one's
friends, and assisting members of one's community. Whether these
responsibilities are also ensconced in the law is of secondary
importance because the good society is failing when it has to rely on
the law as the first line of defense to shore up these responsibilities.
To reiterate, here responsibilities are first and foremost moral
commitments.
Some communitarian writing has been interpreted, perhaps not
without reason, as implying that communities are essentially social




units, which foster responsibilities but are hostile to rights.81
However, as I have argued extensively elsewhere, a good society can
combine respect for individual rights while nourishing social
responsibilities.Y Thus, there is no inherent contradiction between,
say, the right to free speech, assembly, protection from unreasonable
searches and seizures, etc., and living up to one's responsibilities to
one's children, friends, and so on. And in those situations where
tension does arise between rights and responsibilities, the good
society need not assume a priori that responsibilities have the higher
claim. In short, a high respect for rights and responsibilities can be
combined. The main difference between the civil society and good
society is that the former is right focused while the latter is concerned
with balancing rights and responsibilities.83 The core concept of the
prescriptive state is duty. Duty entails obligations imposed on the
citizens by law and largely enforced by the law.
COMBINATIONS
Now that the basic elements and features of the three ideal types
have been explored, one can turn to the question of combinations,
especially that of whether a society can be both civil and good? For
starters, no society is completely free of any of the three basic types;
all have some measure of state coercion, some shared definition of
the good, and as a rule some civility, although sometimes it is hard to
find. The question therefore concerns those combinations in which
two of these elements play a central role in the societal makeup.
While space will not allow me to demonstrate this point here, it
seems clear that there is a considerable amount of tension between
the civil society's focus on liberty and the good society's focus on the
definition of shared values, which of course means that certain ranges
of behavior are considered immoral 4 However, to the extent that
81. See, e.g., Linda C. McClain, Rights and Irresponsibility, 43 DUKE L.J. 989, 1029 (1994).
82. ETZIONI, supra note 6.
83. The same holds for liberty and social order, not discussed here.
84. In American history this issue arises in terms of what is the American genius, a society
based on individual rights, republican virtues, or some combination of the two. For discussion,
see Louis HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA: AN INTERPRETATION OF
AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION (1955). In response to Hartz, see
ISAAC KRAMNICK, REPUBLICANISM AND BOURGEOIS RADICALISM: POLITICAL IDEOLOGY IN
LATE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1990); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE
MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC
REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975); Rogers M. Smith, Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz:
The Multiple Traditions in America, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 549, 553-54, 559 (1993).
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the good society relies on education and persuasion rather than
coercion, the two kinds of societies can be reconciled.85
Finally, one may argue, as A Call to Civil Society does among
many others, that the civil society relies on a moral base provided by
earlier generations (a base sometimes defined as religious and as
based on one particular religious tradition such as Judeo-Christian,
Christian, or Protestantism). 6 Moreover, one may argue that the civil
society becomes endangered as this base erodes. As A Call to Civil
Society states:
Because our civic truths are largely constitutional and procedural,
they do not tell us how to pursue happiness or how to live a good
life. Instead, they establish principles of justice for a society in
which pluralism is a fact and freedom is a birthright. In addition to
civic truths, then, our democracy depends upon moral truths.Y
A communitarian readily sees the merit of the "basis" thesis but
might well argue that the shared values in question could be religious,
more broadly spiritual, or based on secular ethics-for instance, on
what Sanford Levinson called the constitutional faith.8
CONCLUSION
The preceding analysis illustrates the merit of drawing a
distinction between the civil society and good society (and between it
and the prescriptive state). These concepts draw on rather different
social philosophies, rely on different kinds of laws, and treat the laws
they do rely on differently. Moreover, their social formations-from
voluntary associations to families and communities- play rather
distinct roles and are viewed differently in the laws of these various
kinds of societies. There is no law against collapsing all these
differences and folding these conceptions into one, that of the civil
society. However, this article claims that such overpacking of the
term is hindering sound analysis.
85. For much more discussion, see ETZIONI, supra note 6, at 34-57.
86. See MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Talcott
Parsons trans., Routledge 1992) (1930).
87. COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOC'Y, supra note 2, at 12.
88. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 90-121 (1988); see also ETzIONI, supra
note 6, at 217-58.
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